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I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution is both color blind and color conscious.  To avoid conflict with
the equal protection clause, a classification that denies a benefit, causes harm,
or imposes a burden must not be based on race.  In that sense, the Constitu-
tion is color blind.  But the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimi-
nation being perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination.  The
criterion is the relevancy of color to a legitimate governmental purpose.1
“The majority’s concept of ‘consistency’ ignores a difference, funda-
mental to the idea of equal protection, between oppression and
assistance.”2
In the famed In re Marriage Cases, former chief justice of the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court Ronald George had to address whether “the fail-
ure to designate the official relationship of same-sex couples as
marriage violate[d] the California Constitution.”3  Central to his de-
termination was whether to apply rational basis review, the tradi-
tional standard applied in sexual orientation-based discrimination
cases,4 or a heightened, more exacting form of scrutiny.  The level of
scrutiny was important because, as Judge Dolores Sloviter opined, “it
is often how the question is framed that determines [how] the an-
swer . . . is received.”5
1. United States v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th Cir. 1966),
reh’g granted, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967).
2. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 264 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
3. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008).
4. See infra section III.C.
5. Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1567 (3d Cir. 1996) (Sloviter, C.J.,
dissenting).
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2013] REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 3
Justice George’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to sexual orienta-
tion-based classifications6 left a temporary though certainly indelible
mark on equal protection challenges going forward.  The decision has
lasting and readily apparent consequences.  While the lesbian, gay,
bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community can temporarily rejoice
at its new-found status as an inherently suspect class within the con-
fines of the Equal Protection Clause (and its attendant protections), as
the law stands, this community is now at a serious disadvantage
should California seek to implement any sort of remedial legislation to
rectify past discrimination, to further integrate the community into
historically off-limits positions, or to consider a prospective student’s
LGBT status as a positive factor in the university admissions process.
This is because courts almost uniformly apply the same level of
scrutiny to legislation that makes racial, gender, or sexual orienta-
tion-based classifications regardless of the legislation’s benign or in-
vidious purpose.7  Thus, the same court scrutinizing odious legislation
(blacks may not gain admittance to state universities) would be
equally as skeptical toward legislation that sought to rectify that dis-
crimination (schools may consider race as a positive factor in univer-
sity admissions on the basis of, inter alia, historical disadvantage,
obtaining a critical mass, diversity, etc.).  The level of the scrutiny—
rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, or strict scrutiny—would apply
based on the type of classification and would apply consistently in
spite of the legislation’s purpose.
The import of the jurisprudential consistency is a system through
which it is theoretically easier to pass affirmative action policies for
the LGBT community and women than for ethnic minorities under the
Fourteenth Amendment.  This oddity is particularly striking in light
of the Fourteenth Amendment’s stated purpose to “ameliorat[e] . . .
the condition of the freedmen,” the ethnic minorities the Fourteenth
Amendment sought to protect.8  While this author takes the position
that the LGBT community and women deserve full protection under
the Equal Protection Clause—including as the beneficiaries of reme-
dial legislation—it is wholly unsuitable that the current framework
discriminates against the class of people the Amendment originally
intended to protect.
Thus, should most states (notably, excluding California) seek to
implement legislation aimed at increasing educational or employment
opportunities for the LGBT community, legislators should find repose
in the current framework, which applies rational basis review.  How-
ever, should California seek to implement an employment or educa-
tional affirmative action plan, under the current and historically fatal
6. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 444.
7. See infra section II.C.
8. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
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strict scrutiny standard, legislators would face a near-impossible
battle.9
Part II of this Article will canvass the societal ills, injustices, and
discriminatory policies that remedial legislation is meant to combat.
This country’s long-standing inequities against racial minorities, wo-
men, and gays and lesbians are well-documented and have frequently
served as the basis for upholding a compelling or substantial govern-
mental interest in remedying the injustices or striking down invidious
legislation.10  As most challenges to remedial legislation are grounded
in the Equal Protection Clause, Part II will also briefly canvass the
Fourteenth Amendment’s history, giving specific credence to its role
as a Reconstruction-era remunerative measure and Section Five’s af-
firmative grant of power.  Part II will then scan both federal and state
law as applied to remedial legislation for race, gender, and sexual ori-
entation-based classifications, respectively.  Circuit splits and
state–federal splits will be addressed.  Lastly, in Part II, Justice
Thurgood Marshall’s “sliding-scale” alternative to the three-tiered
level of scrutiny will be explored.
Next, Part III will offer substantial critiques of the levels of scru-
tiny applied in those cases, noting the vehement and passionate dis-
sents by, among others, Justices Marshall and Stevens.  Section III.B
will highlight the current framework’s logical inconsistencies.  To il-
lustrate this inconsistency, the Article explores the anomaly that
under federal law the current framework makes it easier for Congress
to enact affirmative action policies for gays and lesbians and women
than for ethnic minorities.  The Article goes on to criticize the use of
strict scrutiny in remedial contexts.  As one scholar noted, “[T]his
framework has evolved to a point where suspect classification analysis
has become the Court’s ‘chief instrument’ for invalidating measures
intended to remedy rather than perpetuate past race discrimina-
tion.”11  Indeed, Justice Marshall found that “it is more than a little
ironic that, after several hundred years of class-based discrimination
against Negroes, the Court is unwilling to hold that a class-based rem-
edy for that discrimination is permissible.”12
The Article argues that applying near-fatal scrutiny to race-based
remedial legislation while applying lesser scrutiny to gender and sex-
ual orientation-based remedial legislation is incongruent to the pro-
position that the level of scrutiny is designed to comport with the level
9. For a full explanation of the hypothetical, see infra section III.B.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557–58 (1996); Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 497–98 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
11. Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. 481, 494 (2004) (empha-
sis added).
12. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 400 (1978) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
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of protection the class deserves.  Section III.C will dispel the notion
that strict scrutiny is needed to “smoke out” illegitimate uses of race,
gender, or sexual orientation-based measures, pointing out that strict
scrutiny provides no search function, but rather rings a near-auto-
matic death knell.  Finally, the Article concludes that Justice Mar-
shall’s sliding-scale scrutiny approach13 is the appropriate calculus by
which to assess the constitutionality of remedial legislation.  Justice
Marshall emphasizes that the calculus should focus on the invidious-
ness of the legislation at issue, as opposed to the type of classification
made.
II. BACKGROUND
A. A Discussion of the Injustices Remedial Legislation Is
Meant to Combat
Remedial legislation encompasses oft-critiqued “affirmative action”
policies that reflect positive legislative steps to either rectify or ame-
liorate past injustices14 or inclusionary policies that seek to increase
diversity.15  This section will examine the specific injustices these pol-
icies seek to combat.  A history of our county’s unfortunate and lasting
discriminatory policies and attitudes toward blacks, women, and gays
and lesbians will now be discussed in turn.
1. Race
In justifying the need for remedial legislation, Justice Marshall
started at the beginning: A slave was “thrust into bondage for forced
labor, . . . deprived of all legal rights.  It was unlawful to teach him to
read; he could be sold away from his family and friends at the whim of
his master; and killing or maiming him was not a crime.”16  Antebel-
lum law, ranging from the Missouri Compromise17 to the Dred Scott
decision,18 exacerbated the plight.  The onset of the Civil War and its
promises of freedom portended no cure-all palliative either.  As ob-
served by the Court in the Slaughter-House Cases,19 “When the ar-
mies of freedom found themselves upon the soil of slavery they could
13. This approach is proposed in Justice Marshall’s dissents in Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), and San Antonio Independent School District v. Rod-
riguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
14. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Metro Broad.,
Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469 (1989).
15. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306 (2003); Bakke, 438 U.S. 265.
16. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 387–88.
17. Act of Mar. 6, 1820, ch. 22, 3 Stat. 545 (repealed 1854).
18. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
19. 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
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6 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1
do nothing less than free the poor victims whose enforced servitude
was the foundation of the quarrel.”20
While the Civil War-era amendments set the foundation for future
legal battles and served as the justification for the remedial legislative
measures at issue, their impact on subsequent case law was negligi-
ble.21  Justice Marshall noted that, following the infamous Plessy v.
Ferguson,22 “segregation of the races was extended to residential ar-
eas, parks, hospitals, theaters, waiting rooms, and bathrooms . . . even
statutes and ordinances which authorized separate phone booths for
Negroes and whites, which required that textbooks used by children of
one race be kept separate from those used by the other.”23  This segre-
gation was not “limited to public facilities, moreover, but was enforced
by criminal penalties against private action as well. . . .”24  Jim Crow’s
pervasive psychological effects generated a culture of “[b]ias[,] both
conscious and unconscious, reflecting traditional and unexamined
habits of thought.”25
The effects of “a system of racial caste” compelled Justice Ginsburg
to urge the Adarand Court to recognize “Congress’ [sic] authority to
act affirmatively, not only to end discrimination, but also to counter-
act discrimination’s lingering effects.”26  Ginsburg reasoned that,
given the Fourteenth Amendment’s history, Congress was well within
its power to “conclude that a carefully designed affirmative action pro-
gram may help to [finally] realize . . . the ‘equal protection of the laws’
the Fourteenth Amendment has promised since 1868.”27
20. Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
21. “The Court’s ultimate blow to the Civil War Amendments and to the equality of
Negroes came in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).” Bakke, 438 U.S. at 392
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  For a discussion on the Civil War Amendments, see
infra section II.B.
22. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
23. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 393 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 371 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
25. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 274 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
26. See id. at 273.  Justice Ginsburg cited several manifestations of discrimination’s
long-lasting effects: “Job applicants with identical re´sume´s, qualifications, and
interview styles still experience different receptions, depending on their race.
White and African-American consumers still encounter different deals.  People of
color looking for housing still face discriminatory treatment by landlords, real
estate agents, and mortgage lenders.  Minority entrepreneurs sometimes fail to
gain contracts though they are the low bidders, and they are sometimes refused
work even after winning contracts.” Id.
27. Id. at 274.
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2. Gender
Nearly forty years ago, the Supreme Court publicly acknowledged
“our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimina-
tion.”28  Women were not allowed a right to vote until 1920, and for
the next half-century, courts “could withhold from women opportuni-
ties accorded men so long as any ‘basis in reason’ could be conceived
for the discrimination.”29  Justice Ginsburg, in providing evidence to
support the unfortunate discrimination, looked to a publication from
that time,30 which read:
The faculty . . . never maintained that women could not master legal learn-
ing. . . .  No, its argument has been . . . more practical.  If women were admit-
ted to the Columbia Law School, [the faculty] said, then the choicer, more
manly and red-blooded graduates of our great universities would go to the
Harvard Law School!31
As further evidence, Justice Ginsburg also affirmed that “[m]ore re-
cently, women seeking careers in policing encountered resistance
based on fears that their presence would ‘undermine male solidarity,’
deprive male partners of adequate assistance, and lead to sexual mis-
conduct.”32  With this background, some states and state entities have
sought to give women preference in employment and business
settings.33
3. Sexual Orientation
Judge Richard Posner described the prevailing attitude toward
gays and lesbians as “one of strong disapproval, frequent ostracism,
social and legal discrimination, and at times ferocious punishment.”34
One court noted that “homosexuality was long considered a mental
illness—a notion since discarded by the medical community—amena-
ble to aversion therapy, and other ‘treatments’ now considered ineffec-
tive and unethical.”35  Further, gays have been characterized as
28. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973).
29. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996).
30. Id. at 543–44.
31. 120 THE NATION 173 (Oswald Garrison Villard ed., 1925) (originally published in
No. 31111, Feb. 18, 1925).
32. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 544 (citation omitted).
33. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Coal. for Econ. Equity, 950
F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1991); Conlin v. Blanchard, 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).
34. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 432 (Conn. 2008) (quoting
RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 291 (1994); see also Note, The Constitu-
tional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1302 (1985) (“It is . . . uncontroversial that gays as a group
suffer from stigmatization in all spheres of life.  The stigma has persisted
throughout history, across cultures, and in the United States.”).
35. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 860 F. Supp. 417,
437 (S.D. Ohio 1994), rev’d and vacated, 54 F.3d 261 (6th Cir. 1995), cert. granted,
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8 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1
having “effeminate mental defects with a proclivity towards
pedophilia, and a host of other deviant sexual practices.”36
The Supreme Court of Connecticut offered evidence that, “ ‘when
compared to other social groups, homosexuals are still among the most
stigmatized groups in the nation.  Hate crimes are prevalent. . . . Gay
and lesbian adolescents are often taunted and humiliated in their
school settings.’”37  New York Court of Appeals Chief Justice Judith
Kaye, in dissent, stated that the prejudice against homosexuals “has
fostered a general climate of hostility and distrust, leading in some
instances to physical violence against those perceived to be homosex-
ual or bisexual.”38  While one court ruled that “gays, lesbians and
bisexuals have suffered a history of discrimination based on inaccu-
rate, stereotyped notions of their sexual orientation,”39 other courts
have gone as far as stating that “gay persons share a history of perse-
cution comparable to that of blacks and women.”40  Regardless of com-
parison, it is evident that gays, lesbians, and bisexuals, like ethnic
minorities and women, have suffered through a history steeped in dis-
crimination sufficient to merit remedial and ameliorative legislation.
B. An Introduction to Remedial Legislation
In light of our discriminatory history, some legislatures have felt it
incumbent upon themselves to remedially legislate.  As a prelude to
this analysis, it is salient to note that while remedial legislation is not
always affirmative action, the overall gist is the same: legislation is
aimed either to compensate or to integrate.41  Compensatory legisla-
tion compensates past discrimination—a wrong must have occurred to
justify such legislation.42  Integrative legislation “aims to bring [the
disadvantaged] into the mainstream by dismantling current barriers
to their advancement . . . by proactively using [characteristic-con-
scious] means to undo the continuing causes of unjust [race-, gender-,
or sexual orientation-based] disadvantage.”43
judgment vacated, 518 U.S. 1001 (1996), and rev’d and vacated, 128 F.3d 289 (6th
Cir. 1997).
36. Id. at 436.
37. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432–33 (alteration in original) (quoting Snetsinger v. Mont.
Univ. Sys., 104 P.3d 445, 456 (2004) (Nelson, J., concurring)).
38. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 28 (N.Y. 2006).
39. See Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 860 F. Supp. at 437.
40. Snetsinger, 104 P.3d at 456 (Nelson, J., Concurring) (citing People v. Garcia, 77
Cal. App. 4th 1269, 1276 (2000)); see also Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 432–33 (incorpo-
rating the quotation in Snetsinger).
41. Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action, and Strict Scrutiny, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1195, 1196 (2002).  For example, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v.
Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
42. Anderson, supra note 41, at 1197.  For example, see Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Anderson, supra note 41, at 1197.
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2013] REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 9
Examining the beginnings of remedial legislation is particularly
apt in light of certain judicial intractability in this arena.  In the af-
firmative action context, courts have remained hesitant to hold that
the Equal Protection Clause empowers legislatures to remunerate
those aggrieved or rectify those ills suffered.44  Nevertheless, based on
the historical underpinnings and legislative intent behind the Four-
teenth Amendment, there is significant evidence that it does.  This
section will examine the very beginnings of race-based remedial legis-
lation, beginning with the short-lived but impactful Freedman’s
Bureau.
1. The Freedman’s Bureau
The brainchild of a small but important group of legislators, reme-
dial legislation aimed at recompensing African-Americans sprung out
of the post-Civil War era Freedman’s Bureau and the corresponding
Freedman’s Bureau Bill.  The Bureau was charged with administering
various race-conscious measures to assist recently freed slaves in the
post-Civil War American landscape.45  Congressional consideration of
Freedmen’s Bureau legislation contained arguments for and against
remedial race-based legislation remarkably similar to the arguments
made in the current affirmative action debate.46  “The various stat-
utes that accorded special protection to African-Americans [in the era]
gave them provisions, clothing, and fuel, as well as the opportunity to
lease or purchase certain land.”47  After failed attempts in 1864 and
1865, the Bureau proposed legislation in 1866 that would have em-
powered the President to reserve up to three million acres of land to
disseminate to the freed slaves in “parcels not exceeding forty
acres.”48  It is extremely important to note that the idea behind the
relevant legislation, indeed its specific purpose, was to compensate
those aggrieved.
Bearing a striking resemblance to a current affirmative action ob-
jection, an opponent, Senator Wiley, complained that the bill made “a
[facial] distinction on account of color between the two races.”49  The
44. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 269; City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 490 (1989).
45. See Eric Schnapper, Affirmative Action and the Legislative History of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 71 VA. L. REV. 753, 754–55 (1985).
46. See id. at 755.
47. Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 UCLA L. REV. 653, 681–82 (2000).
48. Schnapper, supra note 45, at 762; see also McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp.
Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (“[T]he 39th Congress was intent upon establishing
in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply to
meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.”).  This
is the origin of “reparations” as used in everyday parlance. Id.
49. Schnapper, supra note 45, at 763.  Congressman Taylor stated that “[s]uch par-
tial legislation . . . cannot be lasting; it seems to me to be in opposition to the
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10 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1
opposition objected to the pleas for equality on the basis of the facial
discrimination.  Despite strong desire to elevate and ameliorate the
condition of the freed slaves, many Congressmen, in the name of
“equality before the law,” nevertheless lodged their complaints, argu-
ing “not to allow this bill to pass regardless of the great principle,
equality before the law.”50  Presented before the Thirty-Ninth Con-
gress, the bill passed—though eventually, President Andrew Johnson
vetoed the bill.51  Notably, in vetoing the bill, President Johnson
“urged that Congress limit federal protection to whatever relief might
be provided by the federal courts.”52  This recommendation is of partic-
ular importance in this analysis, especially in light of some Justices’
refusal to use the power of the federal courts to uphold affirmative
action plans.53
2. The Fourteenth Amendment
Despite the eventual failure of the Freedman’s Bureau, and its dis-
bandment in 1869, its importance should not be overlooked.  The 1866
Freedmen’s Bureau Act was described as the “most far-reaching, ra-
cially restricted and vigorously contested” of the Civil War-era pro-
grams, and was enacted by the same Thirty-Ninth Congress that
adopted the Fourteenth Amendment.54
Introductorily, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment is a re-
straint on a State’s ability to legislate55: “No state shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”56
Section 5, on the other hand, enables Congress to legislate: “a positive
grant of legislative power.”57  It mandates, “The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this arti-
cle.”58  Specifically, Senator Howard of the Thirty-Ninth Congress de-
scribed Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as “a direct
affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all the princi-
ples of all [the] guarantees” of Section 1 of the Amendment.59  Thus,
the authority to afford equal protection of laws by affirmative legisla-
plain spirit pervading nearly every section of the Constitution that congressional
legislation should in its operation affect all alike.” Id. at 763–64.
50. Id. at 764.
51. See id. at 769.
52. Id. at 770 (emphasis added).
53. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 371 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
54. See Schnapper, supra note 45, at 784.
55. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
57. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
59. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (emphasis added).  He further
stated that Section 5 “casts upon the Congress the responsibility of seeing to it,
for the future, that all the sections of the amendment are carried out in good
faith, and that no State infringes the rights of persons or property.” Id. at 2768.
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2013] REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 11
tion is well within the ambit of Section 5.  As to what kind of legisla-
tion should be implemented, we should refer to the Fourteenth
Amendment’s objective: “the amelioration of the condition of the freed-
man,” as articulated by the very same congressmen who passed the
1866 Freedman’s Bureau Act.60
Simply put, aggrieved former slaves were to be actively compen-
sated for the injustices suffered through remedial legislation enabled
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  Multiple Justices have rejected this
line of thinking.61  In invalidating remedial legislation, multiple Jus-
tices have focused on the Clause’s negative quality as a strict anti-
discrimination mandate.62  The argument derives from the statutory
interpretation obligation that, “[a] limitation on power, declared in
negative terms, is more apt to be given a mandatory construction and
applied as an absolute with no exceptions or deviations tolerated than
directives written in affirmative terms.”63  However, this argument is
flawed.  Whether a statute is framed in affirmative or negative terms
is often only superficially helpful, as often “there is no real substance
to the distinction.”64  Rather, the important inquiry leads us to the
legislative history, which shows “how draftsmen of a provision under-
stood it . . . and has been held to be entitled to greater weight than
subsequent . . . interpretation.”65
The draftsmen understood the Amendment to be an affirmative
grant to legislate.66  In fact, “[a]ll three of the Civil War Amendments
empowered Congress to [subsequently act] ‘by appropriate legisla-
60. Schnapper, supra note 45, at 785 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459
(1866)).  The amelioration language is almost identical to that of Congressman
Moulton’s only three months before to describe the object of the Freedmen’s Bu-
reau bill.  “Stevens’ choice of language reflects the identity of purpose underlying
the two measures.” Id. at 785.
61. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349–51 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290–91 (1978).
62. In an 1879 decision, Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court sweepingly
proclaimed that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to ensure that
“no discrimination shall be made against [blacks] by law because of their color.”
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 307 (1879), abrogated by Taylor v. Loui-
siana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975).
63. 1A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 24:2 (7th ed. 2007) (emphasis added).
64. Id.
65. Id. at § 48:12 n.12.
66. The Congress that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment was the same Congress
that validated the Freedman’s Bureau.  See Schnapper, supra note 45, at 784.
The Freedman’s Bureau understood the object of this genre of legislation should
be to rectify past harms by future action. See supra notes 47–48 and accompany- R
ing text.  Of course, supporting this conclusion is Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, stating that “[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appro-
priate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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tion.’”67  The Amendment’s power as predicate authority to legislate is
buttressed by a separate statutory construction canon: that remedial
statutes have a distinctly prospective attribute.68  In other words, the
Equal Protection Clause’s stated remedial purpose intended to pro-
spectively empower Congress to continue to remedy the condition of
freed slaves and their descendants.  Courts have also reached this con-
clusion; the power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment under Section 5 was affirmed in City of Boerne v. Flores,69 and
the ability to do so remedially was confirmed in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach.70
The drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment certainly did not ex-
pect it to be used “to strike down the special protection legislation that
it considered desirable for African-Americans.”71  Rather, “Congress’s
solution was to end the Government’s complicity in constitutionally
forbidden racial discrimination by providing the Executive Branch
with the authority” to act affirmatively.72  This result is also com-
pelled by a canon of construction which holds that “[c]ourts should not
read into a remedial statute an exception that would impose obstacles
to the achievement of its purpose.”73
With this background, the Fourteenth Amendment has frequently
served as the power needed for Congress to affirmatively rectify past
discrimination.74  In City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co.,75 Justice
O’Connor made it very clear that,
Congress, unlike any State or political subdivision, has a specific constitu-
tional mandate to enforce the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The
power to ‘enforce’ may at times also include the power to define situations
which Congress determines threaten principles of equality and to adopt pro-
phylactic rules to deal with those situations.  The Civil War Amendments
themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between congressional
and state power over matters of race.76
Justice Thurgood Marshall, a feverish advocate for remedial legis-
lation, recognized the extent to which opportunities had been fore-
67. 3B SINGER & SINGER, supra note 63, § 76:2. R
68. 3 id. at § 60:1.
69. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
70. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
71. Colker, supra note 47, at 682.  The distinction extends to states’ ability to enact
remedial legislation.  One scholar concluded, “Congress, fully aware of the racial
limitations in the Freedmen’s Bureau programs, cannot have intended the
amendment to forbid the adoption of such remedies by itself or the states.”
Schnapper, supra note 45, at 785.
72. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 336 (1978).
73. 3 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 63, § 60:1 (emphasis added).
74. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990); Ensley Branch, NAACP v.
Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994).
75. 488 U.S. 469 (1980).
76. Id. at 490 (citations omitted).
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2013] REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 13
closed to black people and the necessity for proactive solutions.77
Indeed, citing our nation’s turbulent race relations, Marshall stated
that it was the “legacy of unequal treatment that . . . must permit the
institutions of this society to give consideration to race in making deci-
sions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and
prestige in America.”78  In fact, the Supreme Court “has long accepted
the view that constitutional authority to remedy past discrimination
is not limited to the power to forbid its continuation, but extends to
eliminating those effects that would otherwise persist and skew the
operation of public systems . . . .”79  Despite the palpable authority
granting Congress wide latitude to remedy the effects of past harm,
the Court’s demonstrated approach has been eminently restrictive.80
C. An Examination of the Tiered Framework that Applies in
Reviewing Both Invidious and Remedial Legislation
1. Scrutiny for Race-Based Classifications: Developing Strict
Scrutiny
The Equal Protection Clause’s stated purpose fell upon deaf judi-
cial ears toward the turn of the century.  Indeed, after Plessy, the
Court did not explicitly consider whether legislation premised on a
race-based classification should be treated differently until 1938.  In
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.,81 the Court
posited, but did not resolve, “whether prejudice against discrete and
insular minorities may be a special condition, . . . which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”82  However, its
mere mention is eminently significant, as one scholar deemed it the
“genesis of the Court’s modern three-tiered approach to equal protec-
tion analysis.”83
77. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (Marshall, J., concurring).
78. Id.
79. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 269 (1995) (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (emphasis added).  In fact, in Adarand, “a majority of the Court [reiterated]
that there are circumstances in which Government may, consistently with the
Constitution, adopt programs aimed at remedying the effects of past invidious
discrimination.” Id. at 270.
80. The post-Metro Broadcasting caselaw has eliminated almost every avenue for re-
medial race-based legislation.  At the time this article was written, the Supreme
Court was weighing whether or not to extend Grutter’s critical-mass theory. See
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132
S. Ct. 1536 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013).
81. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
82. Id. at 152 n.4.
83. Brent E. Simmons, Reconsidering Strict Scrutiny of Affirmative Action, 2 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 51, 74 (1996). But see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny,
54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2007) (“Historically, the modern strict scrutiny
formula did not emerge until the 1960s, when it took root simultaneously in a
number of doctrinal areas.  It did not clearly originate in race discrimination
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The Court confirmed a more searching judicial inquiry in the infa-
mous Korematsu v. United States,84 which upheld the legality of the
domestic World War II Japanese Internment camps.85  A later case,
Bolling v. Sharpe,86 stated that “[c]lassifications based solely upon
race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are contrary
to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”87
The level of scrutiny applies if the law burdens a fundamental
right or targets a suspect class.88  In developing the suspect class stan-
dard and searching for what kinds of people are subject to the “most
exacting scrutiny,” Justice Powell delineated the “traditional indicia of
suspectness”—whether a group has been “saddled with such disabili-
ties, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or
relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.”89
The standard evolved into common-day strict scrutiny, which requires
that racial classifications serve a compelling governmental interest
and that the classification be narrowly tailored to further that inter-
est.90  Forward thinking, the indicia has been used to uphold strict
scrutiny’s application to other (non-racial) types of classifications.91
With the exception of a few cases, including Metro Broadcasting, Inc.
v. FCC,92 the Court has categorically applied strict scrutiny to assess
the constitutionality of race-based classifications, regardless of the
statute’s purpose, be it invidious or remedial.93
The first Supreme Court challenge to an unequivocally race-based
remedial state program was Bakke, in which a white male who was
denied admission to a state medical school challenged the legality of
the school’s special admissions program, which reserved sixteen slots
for “disadvantaged” minority students.94  In finding that “[r]acial and
ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for
cases, as some have suggested, nor in free speech jurisprudence, as Justice
Harlan once claimed.”).
84. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (noting that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect” and courts must subject
them to the “most rigid scrutiny”).
85. Id. at 223–24.
86. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
87. Id. at 499.
88. City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
89. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973).
90. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
91. Homosexuality is one example. See infra subsection II.C.3.b.iii.
92. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
93. See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306
(2003); Adarand Constructors, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); City of Richmond v. J.A.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265
(1978).
94. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 265.
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the most exacting judicial examination,” the Court held that the spe-
cial admissions program was unconstitutional.95
The Court struggled with justifying the remedial aspect of the pro-
gram.  It stated that “it may not always be clear that a so-called pref-
erence is in fact benign,” noting an absence of constitutional support
for “the notion that individuals may be asked to suffer otherwise im-
permissible burdens in order to enhance the societal standing of their
ethnic groups.”96  Further, the Court objected to the classification on
the grounds that preferential programs may only reinforce common
stereotypes that certain groups are unable to achieve success without
special protection.97
The Court relented on its stance in Fullilove v. Klutznick98 and rec-
ognized Congress’s ability under Section 5 to act remedially.99  There,
Congress, recognizing a dearth of opportunity for minorities within
the construction industry, “embarked on a remedial program to place
them on a more equitable footing with respect to public contracting
opportunities.”100  In stark contrast to the nearly unconditional anti-
racial classification stance advocated in Bakke, the Court specifically
affirmed that Congress retained the “necessary latitude to try new
techniques such as the limited use of racial and ethnic criteria to ac-
complish remedial objectives.”101
The Court’s deference to Congressional power demarcated a clear
shift from Bakke.  The Fullilove decision was nearly bereft of the
lengthy concerns and hesitations replete in Bakke.  Rather, the deci-
95. Id. at 291.  Justice Powell went on to note, “Preferring members of any one group
for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is discrimination for its own sake.”
Id. at 307.
96. Id. at 298.
97. See id.  For an interesting perspective on stereotype enforcement, see Justice
Thomas’s concurrence in Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349–87 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Justice Powell reasoned that if he were to consider the remedial nature of the
program in effecting the level of scrutiny, the classifications touching on racial
and ethnic background would “vary with the ebb and flow of political force.”
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298.
98. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
99. Id. at 482 (citing Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 18–21
(1971)); see also United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (holding a
modified standard of review should be applied to race-based affirmative action
plans, noting that traditional racial classifications are distinct from benign racial
classifications and thus demand a modified form of inquiry).
100. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 485–86.
101. Id. at 490. Bakke allowed a program where race was “simply one element—to be
weighed fairly against other elements—in the selection process.” Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 318.  Despite the court’s admission that “[a]ny preference based on racial or
ethnic criteria must necessarily receive a most searching examination,” the court
explicitly refused to adopt, “either expressly or implicitly, the formulas of analy-
sis articulated in [Bakke].” Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 491–92.
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sion focused on Congress’s ability to remedy past harms,102 impliedly
recalling the principle that “[Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment]
is a direct affirmative delegation of power to Congress to carry out all
the principles of all [the] guarantees of the Amendment.”103  In the
decade following Fullilove, the Court continued to stray from automat-
ically invalidating affirmative action policies, though it did not go so
far as to give “automatic approval to race-conscious remedies.”104
This was not the case in Croson.  There, the Court was asked to
assess Richmond, Virginia’s decision to require prime contractors
awarded city construction contracts to subcontract at least thirty per-
cent of the dollar amount of each contract to “Minority Business En-
terprises.”105  The Court invalidated the plan for being overly broad,
asserting that since the plan provided no guidance for Richmond to
determine the precise scope of the injury it sought to remedy, the race-
based decision making was essentially limitless in scope and dura-
tion.106  Justice O’Connor was very clear about the standard to be ap-
plied and the permissible uses of racial classification; this has been
described as “strict scrutiny plus.”107  One scholar explained: “First, a
court must use strict scrutiny to eliminate all government interests
that are not compelling or not narrowly tailored.  Second, from any
remaining interests, the court must eliminate all government inter-
ests except the mandatory interest in remedying the acting govern-
ment agent’s past discrimination.”108
Justice Marshall issued a careful, yet caustic dissent in Croson,
opining: “Cynical of one municipality’s attempt to redress the effects of
past racial discrimination in a particular industry, the majority
launches a grapeshot attack on race-conscious remedies in gen-
eral.”109  On the heels of this dissent, he authored Metro Broadcast-
ing.  There, the Court upheld the FCC’s decision to award limited
preference to minorities in determining licenses for new radio or tele-
102. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483 (noting Congress’s “broad remedial powers” of enforce-
ment of the Equal Protection Clause and the propriety of using racial classifica-
tions for remedying violations of antidiscrimination statutes).
103. See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2766 (1866) (quotation omitted).
104. Sameer M. Ashar & Lisa F. Opoku, Justice O’Connor’s Blind Rationalization of
Affirmative Action Jurisprudence—Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 115 S.
Ct. 2097 (1995), 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 223, 227–28 (1996) (referencing Wy-
gant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986); Local 28 of the Sheet Metal
Workers Int’l Ass’n v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); and United States v. Paradise,
480 U.S. 149 (1987)).
105. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
106. See id. at 497–98.
107. Roger Craig Green, Interest Definition in Equal Protection: A Study of Judicial
Technique, 108 YALE L. J. 439, 465 (1998).
108. Id.
109. Croson, 488 U.S at 529 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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vision broadcast stations.110  In finding that the policy did not violate
the Equal Protection Clause, the Court afforded Congress Fullilove-
esque deference, affirming that because the policy bore “the imprima-
tur of longstanding congressional support and direction,” the legisla-
tion was substantially related to the achievement of the important
governmental objective of broadcast diversity.111  The court further
relied on Fullilove for its justification to apply intermediate scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny.112
The window of hope for a lesser standard slammed closed in 1995
with Adarand.  Despite Justice Stevens’s eventually unequivocal sup-
port for a more lenient affirmative action standard,113 Justice O’ Con-
nor used his own words against him.  Relying on Stevens’s Fullilove
dissent, the Court affirmed that “[r]acial classifications are simply too
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justi-
fication and classification,”114 rejuvenating the strict scrutiny stan-
dard and providing it with the lasting fortification it needed.  Justice
Scalia, in concurrence, went even further, declaring that the “govern-
ment can never have a ‘compelling interest’ in discriminating on the
basis of race in order to ‘make up’ for past racial discrimination in the
opposite direction.”115
The Supreme Court continued using strict scrutiny in race-based
affirmative action cases in Grutter116 and Gratz.117 Both cases as-
sessed the University of Michigan’s118 respective practices to increase
the amount of minority students enrolled.  In Gratz, the Court rejected
Michigan’s policy of awarding minority students additional “points”
110. Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 548 (1990).
111. Id. at 600–01.
112. See id. at 564 (citing Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473 (1980)).  Surpris-
ingly, in upholding the interest as compelling, the Court cited Bakke for the pro-
position that, “[j]ust as a diverse student body contributing to a robust exchange
of ideas is a constitutionally permissible goal on which a race-conscious univer-
sity admissions program may be predicated, the diversity of views and informa-
tion on the airwaves serves important First Amendment values.” Metro Broad.,
497 U.S. at 568 (citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–13
(1978)) (internal quotations omitted).
113. See generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, How the Maverick Became a Lion: Af-
firmative Action in the Jurisprudence of John Paul Stevens, 99 GEO. L.J. 1279
(2011).
114. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (citing Fullilove,
448 U.S. at 533–35, 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
115. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring)).  Scalia utilized a familiar argument, em-
phasizing that “under our Constitution there can be no such thing as either a
creditor or a debtor race.” Id.
116. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
117. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
118. In Grutter, the case involved the University of Michigan Law School; in Gratz,
the case focused on the University of Michigan undergraduate program.
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toward acceptance of their application, as the policy was not suffi-
ciently narrowly tailored.119  In Grutter, however, the Court upheld
the university’s interest in achieving a diverse classroom as compel-
ling and their “highly individualized, holistic review of each appli-
cant’s file” as sufficiently narrowly tailored.120  However, the Court
made specific reference to the fact that “[a] core purpose of the Four-
teenth Amendment was to do away with all governmentally imposed
discrimination based on race.”121
In affirming how limited the affirmative action program must be,
the Court warned that “racial classifications, however compelling
their goals, are potentially so dangerous that they may be employed
no more broadly than the interest demands.”122  Scalia went on to
chastise the Court’s lack of “commit[ment] to the principle that racial
classifications are per se harmful and that almost no amount of benefit
in the eye of the beholder can justify such classifications,” despite
their implementation of the throttling strict scrutiny standard, still
applied today.123
2. Scrutiny for Gender-Based Classifications: Quasi-Suspect
Classification
While the framework has not seen the vicissitudes associated with
race-based classifications, gender-based classifications have not al-
ways had a set level of scrutiny.  The first fight for constitutional gen-
der equality was recognized in Reed v. Reed,124 which surrounded a
gender preference (men over women) in deciding who should adminis-
ter estate claims.  There, the Court used rational basis review, fram-
ing the question as “whether a difference in the sex of competing
applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to
a state objective that is sought to be advanced by the opera-
tion . . . .”125  Rational basis was short-lived, however, with the onset
of Frontiero v. Richardson,126 described as “the high-water mark in
the Court’s treatment of sex discrimination.”127  In that case, the
Court identified sex as a suspect class.128 There, a female armed ser-
119. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 275.
120. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
121. Id. at 341 (citation omitted).
122. Id. at 342.  The Court went on to note that “25 years from now, the use of racial
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”
Id. at 343.
123. Id. at 371 (Scalia, J., concurring).
124. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
125. Id. at 76.
126. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (plurality opinion).
127. John Galotto, Note, Strict Scrutiny for Gender, via Croson, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
508, 520 (1993).
128. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 682.
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vices member challenged a parcel of federal statutes that made it
more difficult for women to claim their spouses as dependents when
applying for benefits.129  The classifications were invalidated, inexora-
bly assisted by the Court’s adoption of the formidable strict scrutiny
standard.130
Strict scrutiny’s lifespan was equally ephemeral, yielding to the
more durable, if not “malleable, uncertain, highly flexible, unpredict-
able, contrived, inconsistent, and inadequate” intermediate scrutiny
standard.131  In Craig v. Boren,132 the Supreme Court faced a chal-
lenge to a gender-based classification in Oklahoma statutes prohibit-
ing the sale of a type of beer to males under the age of twenty-one and
females under the age of eighteen.  In articulating the intermediate
scrutiny standard, the Court stated that the classification “must serve
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives.”133
Justice O’Connor gave intermediate scrutiny more bite in Missis-
sippi University for Women v. Hogan,134 requiring that “the party
seeking to uphold a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of
their gender must carry the burden of showing an ‘exceedingly persua-
sive justification’ for the classification.”135  According to one scholar,
“several courts have demanded increasingly stringent factual demon-
strations to support a gender-based classification” premised precisely
on the “exceedingly persuasive justification” advent.136  The Court
further memorialized the standard in the famous Virginia Military In-
stitute (VMI) case, where Justice Ginsburg affirmed the Court would
carefully inspect classifications, noting the “demanding” burden of jus-
tification needed.137  There, Justice Ginsburg made it very apparent
that gender-based discrimination fell within the protections of the
Equal Protection Clause by noting that “[n]either federal nor state
government acts compatibly with the equal protection principle when
a law or official policy denies to women, simply because they are wo-
men, full citizenship stature—equal opportunity to aspire, achieve,
participate in and contribute to society based on their individual tal-
ents and capacities.”138
129. Id. at 678.
130. See id. at 690–91.
131. Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial
Minimalism, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 301 (1998) (internal quotations
omitted).
132. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
133. Id. at 197.
134. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
135. Id. at 724 (citation omitted).
136. Peter Lurie, Comment, The Law as They Found It: Disentangling Gender-Based
Affirmative Action Programs from Croson, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1563, 1568 (1992).
137. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532–33 (1996).
138. Id. at 532.
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3. Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation-Based Classifications: A
Three-Way Split
a. Federal Law
i. Rational Basis
In light of the relative dearth of cases presented before the Su-
preme Court, this subsection will examine both federal and state con-
stitutional discussion of sexual orientation-based legislation.  The
Court first considered a sexual orientation-based classification in
Romer v. Evans139 in 1996, which involved a Colorado voter-approved
referendum that precluded “all legislative, executive, or judicial action
at any level of state or local government designed to protect the
[LGBT community].”140  In balancing the competing state interest
with the underlying purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court
concluded if a law neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted
a suspect class, the Court would uphold the legislative classification so
long as it would bear a rational relation to some legitimate end.141
Nevertheless, despite the lax level of scrutiny, the Court still invali-
dated the referendum, labeling it too narrow and too broad at the
same time.142  In rejecting the referendum, the Court critiqued its
truly unusual and exclusive nature, holding that the resulting dis-
qualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protec-
tion from the law is “unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”143
Lawrence v. Texas144 similarly involved a sexual orientation-based
classification in which two same-sex Texas residents were arrested
and convicted of “deviate sexual intercourse” in violation of a Texas
statute forbidding same-sex intimate sexual conduct.145  While the
case used rational basis review, and despite the fact that the case was
139. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
140. Id. at 623.  The court considered a sexual orientation-based claim in Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), but relied on due process, not equal protection, to
the dissent of Justice Blackmun: “I disagree with the Court’s refusal to consider
whether § 16-6-2 runs afoul of the . . . Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.” Id. at 201 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Notably, Romer preempted
even “DOMA” (Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat.
2419 (codified in relevant part at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006))) as the first case in a line of
many State-sponsored laws limiting the federal definition of marriage to relation-
ships between one man and one woman. See Andrew Koppelman, The Difference
the Mini–DOMAs Make, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 265, 265–66 (2007).
141. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
142. Id. at 633.
143. Id.  “[D]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consid-
eration to determine whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.”
Id.  (internal quotation omitted).
144. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
145. Id. at 562–63.  The Court held that the Texas law “furthers no legitimate state
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the
individual.” Id. at 578.
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virtually invalidated on due process grounds, one academic identifies
“textual morsels in the Court’s opinion in Lawrence that hint that
there is something more than minimal scrutiny at work in its
decision.”146
Compelled by Romer, and to a certain extent Lawrence, the federal
courts of appeal have so far adhered to rational basis review in exam-
ining equal protection claims on the basis of sexual orientation.147  On
a direct challenge to the Defense of Marriage Act’s (DOMA) constitu-
tionality, the First Circuit, in Massachusetts, weighed whether the
statute denied federal economic benefits to people of one sexual orien-
tation, but not the other.148  In determining which level of scrutiny to
apply, the court relied on Cook v. Gates,149 a challenge to the (now-
defunct) “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell,” military policy.150  In a display of ap-
propriate fealty, Cook followed Romer,151 and Massachusetts followed
Cook.152  The court declined to “create such a new suspect classifica-
tion for same-sex relationships[, as it] would have far-reaching impli-
cations.”153  The court recognized that adopting a new level of scrutiny
could “overturn marriage laws in a huge majority of individual
states.”154  Undeterred, the court was able to affirm DOMA’s uncon-
stitutionality under rational-basis review, holding that the denial of
benefits was inadequately supported by any permissible federal inter-
est.155  However, like the “textual morsels” of a more rigorous review
unearthed in Lawrence,156 Massachusetts also imparted a more exact-
ing standard—a “more careful assessment.”157
146. Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 945, 959 (2004); accord Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2012).  There, the court noted that “[t]he
Court has in these cases undertaken a more careful assessment of the justifica-
tions than the light scrutiny offered by conventional rational basis review.” Id. at
11.  Elaborating, the Court stated that “[i]n a set of equal protection decisions,
the Supreme Court has now several times struck down state or local enactments
without invoking any suspect classification.  In each, the protesting group was
historically disadvantaged or unpopular, and the statutory justification seemed
thin, unsupported or impermissible.” Id. at 10.
147. See infra notes 148–60 and accompanying text.
148. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 5.
149. 528 F.3d 42 (1st Cir. 2008).
150. Id.
151. Id. at 61–62 (citing Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)).
152. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 9 (citing Cook, 528 F.3d at 42).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 9–10.
155. Id. at 15.
156. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“When a law
exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we have applied a
more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under the
Equal Protection Clause.”).
157. Massachusetts, 682 F.3d at 11.
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Likewise, the Ninth Circuit administered rational basis review in
invalidating the much-publicized Proposition 8 legislation in Perry v.
Brown.158  In a procedurally complex affair, the court affirmed the
Northern District of California, which ruled against Proposition 8 on
both due process and equal protection grounds.159  In doing so, it un-
equivocally followed Romer, stating that “[t]he question here, then, is
whether California had any more legitimate justification for with-
drawing from gays and lesbians its constitutional protection with re-
spect to the official designation of ‘marriage’ than Colorado did for
withdrawing from that group all protection against discrimination
generally.”160
ii. Intermediate Scrutiny
Recently, the Second Circuit became the first federal appellate
court to apply intermediate scrutiny to sexual orientation-based clas-
sifications in Windsor v. United States.161  There, the plaintiff was de-
nied a spousal deduction from federal estate taxes because DOMA
precluded a same-sex marriage from falling within its accepted defini-
tion of marriage.162  Unlike Massachusetts and Perry, the Second Cir-
cuit did not feel bound by Romer’s decision not to impart quasi-suspect
status on the LGBT community.163  Instead, the court articulated the
four predicate factors in deciding whether to grant quasi-suspect
classification:
A) whether the class has been historically subjected to discrimination; B)
whether the class has a defining characteristic that frequently bears a rela-
tion to ability to perform or contribute to society; C) whether the class exhibits
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a
discrete group; and D) whether the class is a minority or politically
powerless.164
Citing their history of discrimination165 and their progressing-but-
still-unequal representation in the political arena, the court drew a
parallel to discrimination faced by women when it likewise provided
homosexuals quasi-suspect status.166  However, the court noted,
158. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollings-
worth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
159. Id. at 1069.
160. Id. at 1082.
161. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct.
2675 (2013).
162. Id. at 175.
163. Id. at 179 (“The litigants in Romer had abandoned their quasi-suspect argument
after the trial court decision.”); see also Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620, 640 n.1
(1996) (noting the decision by the trial court to apply a rational basis standard
had not been appealed).
164. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 181 (citations omitted).
165. See supra subsection II.A.1.
166. Windsor, 699 F.3d at 182, 184–85.
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“While homosexuals have been the target of significant and long-
standing discrimination in public and private spheres, this mistreat-
ment is not sufficient to require our most exacting scrutiny.”167  Nev-
ertheless, able to dispense with all arguments in support of DOMA,
the court easily found for the plaintiff under the intermediate scrutiny
standard.168
b. State Law
i. Rational Basis
The split is equally apparent for state law claims.  Massachusetts
held denying same-sex couples the right to marry ran afoul of its con-
stitution in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health.169  The defend-
ants in the case, the Department of Public Health, argued, inter alia,
that sexual orientation was not a suspect class and that rational basis
applied.170  In finding that the marriage ban did not even pass ra-
tional basis review, the court did not consider the plaintiffs’ argu-
ments that the case merited strict judicial scrutiny.171
The plaintiffs were not so fortunate in the New York same-sex
marriage case, Hernandez v. Robles.172  The plaintiffs argued that a
prior Court of Appeals of New York decision, Under 21 v. City of New
York,173 had left open the question of whether some level of height-
ened scrutiny could be applied in some situations of discrimination
based on sexual preference.174  The court disagreed and relied on
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.175 in determining that ra-
tional basis should be applied “where individuals in the group affected
by a law have distinguishing characteristics relevant to interests the
state has the authority to implement.”176  The court, in a logically
puzzling move, weighed not the history of discrimination, the political
powerlessness, or the immutability of the characteristic, but rather
the state’s authority to govern over matters of the family in concluding
that gays and lesbians do not merit suspect status.177  Armed with a
167. Id. at 185 (citations omitted).
168. Id. at 188.
169. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
170. Id. at 961.
171. Id.
172. 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006).
173. 482 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 1985).
174. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 10.
175. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
176. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 11 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 441).
177. Id. at 11.  Recall that when deciding what level of scrutiny to apply, the Supreme
Court had to determine whether the law burdens a fundamental right or targets
a suspect class. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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lax standard of review, the court upheld the ban on same-sex mar-
riage, finding that a legislature had a rational basis for doing so.178
ii. Intermediate Scrutiny
The Supreme Court of Connecticut, in an ostensibly remedial legis-
lation case,179 considered the constitutionality of Connecticut’s deci-
sion to disallow same-sex marriage in favor of a civil union law.180
The court, “in light of the history of pernicious discrimination faced by
gay men and lesbians” and considering that the civil union framework
essentially segregated “heterosexual and homosexual couples into sep-
arate institutions,” held that the framework constituted a cognizable
harm.181  In affirming that the law violated the state constitution, the
court held that sexual orientation based discrimination garnered in-
termediate scrutiny as a quasi-suspect classification for the same rea-
sons gender-based discrimination generated intermediate scrutiny.182
The court held as such despite the fact that sexual orientation was not
an enumerated classification on which to make such a finding pursu-
ant to the relevant state statute.183  The court ultimately found that
“[g]ay persons have been subjected to and stigmatized by a long his-
tory of purposeful and invidious discrimination that continues to man-
ifest itself in society,” justifying the conclusion that laws singling
them out for disparate treatment are subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny and ensuring that those laws are not the product of such his-
torical prejudice and stereotyping.184
178. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 6–7.  The court identified two reasons: First, the legis-
lature could rationally decide that it is more important to promote stability in
opposite-sex relationships than in same-sex relationships because of the risk that
[putatively] unstable opposite-sex relationships could lead to the birth of a child;
and second, the legislature could believe children would be better off with a
mother-father dynamic. Id.
179. The State asserted that its “civil union” law effected a wholly sufficient alterna-
tive to gay marriage, providing rights previously not available to same-sex
couples.  While the court did “not doubt that the civil union law was designed to
benefit same-sex couples,” it found that if “the intended effect of a law is to treat
politically unpopular or historically disfavored minorities differently from per-
sons in the majority or favored class, that law cannot evade constitutional review
under the separate but equal doctrine.”  Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957
A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 412.
182. See id.
183. Id. at 448–49.
184. Id. at 431–32.
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iii. Strict Scrutiny
In the mid-1970s, several California same-sex couples applied for
marriage licenses.185  In 1977, at the behest of the County Clerks’ As-
sociation of California, California enacted legislation that clarified the
province of marriage as solely between a man and a woman.186  Its
progeny, “Family Code Section 300,” currently provides in relevant
part that “[m]arriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil con-
tract between a man and a woman, to which the consent of the parties
capable of making that contract is necessary.”187  Its sister statute,
Family Code Section 308.5, provides similar language: “Only marriage
between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”188
The statute was interpreted to apply both to marriages performed in
California and those performed in other jurisdictions.189
The court recognized a “number of distinct and significant issues”
in determining whether the current California statutory scheme relat-
ing to marriage and to registered domestic partnership was constitu-
tionally valid.190  The initial inquiry was to determine the level of
scrutiny to apply, which hinged first on whether the statute itself dif-
ferentiated between classes of people, and if so, whether the sexual
orientation classification merited “suspect classification,” and thus a
higher level of scrutiny.191
The initial “differentiation” inquiry was an easy one.  The court
swiftly held, “By limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples, the mar-
riage statutes, realistically viewed, operate clearly and directly to im-
pose different treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual
orientation.”192  However, the court was quick to concede that “in
most instances the deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review is
applicable in determining whether different[ial] treatment [is mer-
ited] . . . .”193  Again, the court had to determine whether sexual orien-
tation was considered a suspect classification; however, under
California’s equal protection jurisprudence, the court’s alternative
was strict, rather than intermediate, scrutiny.194
185. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 409 (Cal. 2008).
186. See id. at 409.  The legislative intent was quite clear.  “The purpose of the bill was
to prohibit persons of the same-sex from entering lawful marriage.” See id. (cit-
ing SEN. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, ANALYSIS OF ASSEM. BILL NO. 607, at 1 (1977)
(amended 1977).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 410.
190. Id. at 398–99.
191. Id. at 401.
192. Id. at 440.
193. Id. at 401.
194. See id. at 443–44 (emphasis added).
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In making such a determination, the court first assented that “the
great majority of out-of-state decisions that have addressed this issue
have concluded that . . . [unlike] race, sex, religion or national origin,
statutes that treat persons differently because of their sexual orienta-
tion should not be viewed as constitutionally suspect and thus should
not be subjected to strict scrutiny.”195  Undeterred, the court identi-
fied three factors that, if satisfied, would support an application of
strict scrutiny: “The defining characteristic must (1) be based upon an
immutable trait; (2) bear no relation to a person’s ability to perform or
contribute to society; and (3) be associated with a stigma of inferiority
and second class citizenship.”196
Finding that one’s sexual orientation had no relation to a person’s
ability to perform or contribute to society, and refusing to even con-
sider the proposition that gays had not suffered stigmatism,197 the
court turned to whether homosexuality was an immutable trait—
something that gave the court unmistakable pause.198  Drawing a
parallel to religious classifications, where strict scrutiny was upheld
pursuant to their “integral” position in forming a person’s identity, the
court upheld the usage of strict scrutiny for sexual orientation on the
same grounds.199
In a sweeping decision, the court used strict scrutiny to invalidate
the statutes, noting that:
[J]ust as this court recognized in Perez that it was not constitutionally permis-
sible to continue to treat racial or ethnic minorities as inferior . . . and in
Sail’er Inn that it was not constitutionally acceptable to continue to treat wo-
men as less capable than and unequal to men, we now similarly recognize that
an individual’s homosexual orientation is not a constitutionally legitimate ba-
sis for withholding or restricting the individual’s legal rights.200
The court, in explaining its searching inquiry, stated that “even the
most familiar and generally accepted social practices and traditions
often mask an unfairness and inequality that frequently is not recog-
nized or appreciated by those not directly harmed by those practices or
traditions.”201
195. Id. at 441.
196. See id. at 442 (internal quotations omitted).
197. See supra subsection II.A.3.
198. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 441.
199. Id. at 442.  The court refused to answer whether homosexuality was indeed an
immutable trait, stating: “Because a person’s sexual orientation is so integral an
aspect of one’s identity, it is not appropriate to require a person to repudiate or
change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory treatment.”
Id.
200. Id. at 429. (citing Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 20–27 (Cal. 1948); Sail’er Inn,
Inc. v. Kirby, 485 P.2d 529, 539–42 & n.15 (Cal. 1971)).
201. Id. at 451.
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D. Justice Marshall: A Sliding Scale
Dissatisfied with the formalistic tiers of scrutiny, Justice Marshall
created a flexible, “sliding-scale” scrutiny standard of review.202  Ar-
guing that the “Court’s equal protection decisions defy . . . easy catego-
rization into the pigeonholes of tiered scrutiny,” Marshall’s test,
explained in Dandridge v. Williams203 and San Antonio Independent
School District v. Rodriguez,204 is relatively simple.  The right or in-
terest affected is measured by its constitutional or societal importance
and is contrasted against the invidiousness of the classification upon
which the legislation is premised.205  Specifically, the test measures
whether “an appropriate governmental interest [is] suitably furthered
by the differential treatment.”206
Justice Marshall’s dissent in San Antonio Independent School Dis-
trict illustrates the test well.  There, the plaintiffs brought a class ac-
tion lawsuit on behalf of poor, mostly Mexican-American
schoolchildren in an underfunded Texas school district.207  The plain-
tiffs alleged that the state of Texas was discriminating against the
children on the basis of access to equal education.208  Justice Powell,
writing for the majority, found that education was not a fundamental
right nor were “the poor” a suspect class.209  Of course, the Court was
then free to employ rational basis review and correspondingly dis-
missed the plaintiff’s claim with ease.210
Justice Marshall made it very clear he wanted to “voice [his] disa-
greement with the Court’s rigidified approach to equal protection
analysis.”211 He opined that the decision allowed states to “constitu-
tionally vary the quality of education which it offers its children in
accordance with the amount of taxable wealth located in the school
districts within which they reside.”212  He accused the court of cherry-
picking which rights they deemed “fundamental,” impliedly arguing
that the Court can offer the protections to whichever classification and
interests it deems fit.213  It is under this theory that the Court en-
202. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting).  However, according to one scholar, this type of scrutiny was
never termed as such by Justice Marshall. See Rebecca Brown, Deep and Wide:
Justice Marshall’s Contributions to Constitutional Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 637, 645
(2009).
203. 397 U.S. 471, 520–21 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
204. 411 U.S. at 98–99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 99.
206. Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
207. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 8.
208. Id. at 8–9.
209. Id. at 33–37.
210. Id. at 37.
211. Id. at 98.
212. Id. at 70.
213. See id. at 100–02.
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gages only rational basis review for classifications based on sexual ori-
entation,214 but heightened scrutiny for alienage,215 the right to
procreate,216 and the right to appeal a criminal conviction.217
Under Justice Marshall’s approach, the societal and constitutional
importance of the interest adversely affected would be contrasted
against the recognized invidiousness of the classification.218  Thus, so-
cietally important interests, such as the right to vote or the right to
marry a person of the same sex, and constitutionally protected rights,
such as the right to privacy, would automatically be protected against
invidious legislation.  However, in remedial legislation, specifically in
the province of race, the Court would be forced to consider first,
whether fulfilling the objectives of the Fourteenth Amendment was an
important government interest; and second, whether the affirmative
action policy was substantially related to achieving the interest—all
while recognizing the invidiousness upon which the classification was
drawn.219
The test is especially apt considering the serious balancing test re-
medial legislation often induces.  Congress’s ability to act benevolently
should be carefully considered against possible veiled motives based
on stereotypes or odious objectives.220
In dealing with traditional rational-basis review matters like sex-
ual orientation or disability, even members of the judiciary who de-
cline to see the great societal importance in protecting the right to be
with a consenting adult of the same sex221 or the right to be treated
equally under protection of laws on the basis of sexual orientation,222
would have a difficult time ignoring the invidiousness of the legisla-
tion.223  Whereas currently, all that is incumbent upon a state is to
214. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
215. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
216. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
217. See Griffin v. Illinois, 35 U.S. 12 (1956).
218. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 98–99. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
219. See id. at 110.
220. The skepticism is especially merited provided Congress’s less than charitable his-
tory (e.g., the Naturalization Act of 1790, The Alien and Sedition Acts, the Indian
Removal Act, the Missouri Compromise, the Johnson-Reed Act, etc.).
221. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
222. See id.
223. As the Perry court noted, a “civil union” just doesn’t have the same ring. See
Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1078 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“[W]e
emphasize the extraordinary significance of the official designation of ‘marriage.’
That designation is important because ‘marriage’ is the name that society gives to
the relationship that matters most between two adults.  A rose by any other
name may smell as sweet, but to the couple desiring to enter into a committed
lifelong relationship, a marriage by the name of ‘registered domestic partnership’
does not.  The word ‘marriage’ is singular in connoting ‘a harmony in living,’ ‘a
bilateral loyalty,’ and ‘a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully endur-
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generate some rational explanation for the purported legislation,
“when interests of constitutional importance are at stake, the Court
does not stand ready to credit the State’s classification with any con-
ceivable legitimate purpose, but demands a clear showing that there
are legitimate state interests which the classification was in fact in-
tended to serve.”224
Indeed this was a contentious point with Justice Marshall, indica-
tive of his dissatisfaction with the framework in general.225  Justice
Marshall took particular issue with rational basis review by stating:
The extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases for
state regulation . . . may in many instances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion
from the Court’s earlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect interests
that have more than enough power to protect themselves in the legislative
halls.226
However, no longer would gays and lesbians receive the minimal pro-
tections available.  Under this approach, classifications based on sex-
ual orientation,227 disability,228 and poverty-stricken youth,229 would
now receive greater scrutiny and require more legitimate justifica-
tions than under the current, more deferential approach.
III. ARGUMENT
A. Conflict: Critiques and Censure for the Current
Framework
As a preface, it is apparent that the current framework possesses
holes, gaps, and inconsistencies.  Subsection 1, supplied by powerful
dissents and thoughtful analysis, will discuss how strict scrutiny does
not and cannot comport with the aims of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Subsection 2 will discuss how, in the realm of gender-based classifica-
tions, a circuit split has arisen as to how to deal with gender-based
affirmative action plans.  Lastly, subsection 3 will examine how the
current framework has led to a federal–state split in applying a con-
sistent level of scrutiny in sexual orientation-based cases.
ing, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.’”) (citing Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
224. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 125 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
225. See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (“[T]he Court holds today
that regardless of the arbitrariness of a classification it must be sustained if any
state goal can be imagined that is arguably furthered by its effects.”).
226. Id. at 520.
227. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 630 (1996).
228. See City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
229. See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 508.
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1. Race
No longer has “[a]greement upon a means for applying the Equal
Protection Clause to an affirmative-action program” eluded the Su-
preme Court.230  The Court applies strict scrutiny to race-based classi-
fications, regardless of invidious or remedial purpose.  The standard,
as applied, is almost always fatal to race-based affirmative action
plans.231  According to Justice Scalia, this is impelled by the funda-
mental tenet that “[o]ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows
nor tolerates classes among citizens.”232  Scalia lambasts congres-
sional race-based remediation, affirming that Congress can never
have “compelling” justification in discriminating on the basis of race,
regardless of remedial intent.233  One of Scalia’s main objections is the
corollary impact the legislation has on nonminorities.234  He asserts
that “almost no amount of benefit in the eye of the beholder can justify
such classifications” and implores his colleagues to affirm that all ra-
cial classifications are per se harmful.235
To quote Justice Marshall, “[t]his is an unwelcome develop-
ment.”236  The Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to impose
a categorical ban on legislative racial distinction, but rather was
aimed to remedy the effects of slavery.237  According to a study con-
ducted by the U.S. Civil Rights Commission, color-blindness is wholly
230. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 301 (1986) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
231. See Michel Rosenfeld, Decoding Richmond: Affirmative Action and the Elusive
Meaning of Constitutional Equality, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1758 (1989). The seri-
ous nature of the developing strict scrutiny standard was noted in Fullilove,
where Justice Powell asserted that the failure of legislative action to survive
strict scrutiny has “led some to wonder whether our review of racial classifica-
tions has been strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”  Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 507 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
232. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 520 (1989) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring) (quoting Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
233. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
234. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The
nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a civil service job,
or any job at all by reason of their skin color will surely understand.”).
235. Id. at 371 (Thomas, J., concurring).
236. Croson, 488 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. See supra subsection II.B.2.; see also Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155,
1172 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J., dissenting) (arguing the Fourteenth Amendment
does not impose such a strict standard of “color blindness” that it would block
congressional action that remedies past discrimination).  The subscription to
functional color-blindness has had drastic effects.  Following the Croson decision,
state and local governments scaled back or eliminated affirmative action pro-
grams thereby losing much of the progress they had made in the amount of mi-
nority participation in procurement.  Simmons, supra note 83, at 56. R
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ineffective to combat existing discriminatory environments.238  In
such circumstances, the Commission noted that the only effective rem-
edy would be to confront the discrimination directly, to provide direct
opportunity for those harmed, and to recognize the discrimination as a
self-sustaining process and dismantle it accordingly.239  Justice Black-
mun was equally skeptical of the majority’s position.  In finding it im-
possible to combat discrimination through race-neutral means, he
concluded: “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account
of race . . . . And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat
them differently.”240
The principle critique of the current framework reproves the ma-
jority’s inability to discern the polarized differences between remedial
and invidious statutory purposes.  Justice Stevens provided that the
“consistency that the Court espouses would disregard the difference
between a ‘No Trespassing’ sign and a welcome mat.”241  The majority
concerns themselves with the possibility that remedial legislation
could be implemented as a veiled attempt to set minorities back even
further, reinforcing pre-existing stereotypes.242  Justice Thomas’s dis-
sent in Grutter is instructive of the point: “The Court never acknowl-
edges, however, the growing evidence that racial (and other sorts) of
heterogeneity actually impairs learning among black students.”243
However, Justice Marshall understood the difference between a
truly remedial statute and one that served as a veiled discriminatory
instrument.  He opined that “a profound difference separates govern-
mental actions that themselves are racist, and governmental actions
that seek to remedy the effects of prior racism.”244 Justice Marshall
discerned racial classifications that were drawn on the presumption
that one race was inferior from those which aim to erase or ameliorate
the “tragic and indelible” mark the nation has left on its racial minori-
ties.245  In Fullilove, Justice Marshall recognized that the legal princi-
ple that forbade “irrelevant or pernicious use of race” was wholly
“inapposite to racial classifications that provide benefits to minorities
238. See Simmons, supra note 83, at 62–63.
239. Id.
240. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting). “We cannot—we dare not—let the Equal Protection Clause perpetuate
racial supremacy.”
241. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
242. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 364 (2003); Adarand, 515 U.S. 200,
240–41 (Thomas, J., concurring).
243. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 364 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring).
244. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
245. See id.
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for the purpose of remedying the present effects of past racial
discrimination.”246
Moreover, in today’s political landscape, entities and governments
make clear their intent to rectify past harm.247  As such, Justice Ste-
vens was able to differentiate the purposes with ease, noting that the
term “affirmative action” was well understood in “everyday par-
lance.”248  Stevens firmly opposed the Court’s “aggressive supervision”
over remedial legislation, particularly the conflation of legislation in-
tended to exclude and inhibit with that which explicitly intends to
ameliorate the conditions of historically disadvantaged minority
groups.249
Justice Stevens offered dual analogies to support the inapposite
framework.  Stevens revisited the tragic and unfortunate Korematsu
v. United States,250 which upheld the imposition of curfews, exclusion,
and internment camps for Japanese-American citizens during World
War II.251  In order to have effected such a policy, Congress clearly
had to make race-based classifications.  Stevens hypothesized that, in
light of Japanese-Americans’ heroism, Congress would be well within
their means to reward those same citizens with preference in federal
employment hiring.252  He argued that the consistency the Supreme
Court has applied in invalidating both invidious and remedial legisla-
tion would require the Court to prevent Congress from recognizing our
nation’s heroes.253  Stevens rejected the comparison and chastised the
“consistency,” which in theory equates the “special preferences that
the National Government has provided to Native Americans since
1834 . . . [with] the official discrimination against African-Americans
that was prevalent for much of our history.”254  Justice Marshall sum-
marized the sentiment best in Croson, where he censured the court for
concluding that “remedial classifications warrant no different stan-
dard of review under the Constitution than the most brutal and repug-
nant forms of . . . racism.”255
246. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 518 (1980) (Marshall, J., concurring).
247. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306; Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213
(5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411
(2013); Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
248. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (“Its presence in everyday parlance shows that people understand the
difference between good intentions and bad.”).
249. See Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
250. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
251. See id.
252. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
253. See id.
254. Id. at 244–45.
255. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 552 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 21 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
33655-neb_92-1 Sheet No. 21 Side A      08/28/2013   10:13:22
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NEB\92-1\NEB102.txt unknown Seq: 33 14-AUG-13 9:27
2013] REVERSAL OF FORTUNE 33
2. Gender
The Supreme Court has not examined a gender-based affirmative
action program and has examined few benign classifications since
1977.256  Without recent higher authority to the contrary, federal cir-
cuit courts have been free to apply divergent levels of scrutiny to equal
protection challenges.257  The Third, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have applied intermediate scrutiny to remedial gender-based
classifications, whereas the Sixth Circuit has applied strict scru-
tiny.258  Those courts applying the traditional intermediate scrutiny
have adhered to the Supreme Court’s consistency methodology, apply-
ing the same level of scrutiny regardless of remedial or invidious
intent.
Those applying strict scrutiny have been persuaded by the Croson
Court’s inherent suspicion over affirmative action programs.  Accord-
ing to one article written in Croson’s wake, the decision has had a
“mesmeric effect on conservative judges”—though the decision was
specifically directed at programs for racial minorities, certain judges
have interpreted the opinion to require the strict scrutiny standard for
gender-based remedial legislation.259  While one scholar posited sev-
eral reasons why the Court could move in this direction,260 the Court’s
current consistency framework would preclude it from adopting any-
thing but intermediate scrutiny in gender-based affirmative action
cases.261
Nevertheless, the Northern District of California applied strict
scrutiny to examine both a race- and gender-based affirmative action
256. See, e.g., Tuan Anh Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (Congressional decision to
impose easier requirements on unmarried mothers than fathers in conferring cit-
izenship to the child born abroad and out of wedlock); Miss. Univ. for Women v.
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (single-sex admissions policy of MUW’s School of
Nursing was not upheld as a legitimate classification on the asserted ground that
it compensates for discrimination against women and, therefore, constitutes edu-
cational affirmative action); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (whereby a
scheme resulted in slightly higher average monthly wage and a correspondingly
higher level of monthly old-age benefits for the retired female wage earner than
male wage earner).
257. See Jason M. Skaggs, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United
States v. Virginia’s “Exceedingly Persuasive Justification” Standard, 86 CAL. L.
REV. 1169, 1169 (1998) (citation omitted).
258. Id. at 1174–75 (citation omitted).
259. See Lurie, supra note 136, at 1563.
260. See Galotto, supra note 127, at 535–36 (stating the following rationales: (1) mov-
ing further away from a view of the Equal Protection Clause as a primarily race-
based prohibition; (2) rejecting the Carolene Products rationale impugns all man-
ner of affirmative action programs; (3) noting the potential for “arm-twisting” by
preponderant gender groups; and (4) that legislative reliance on racial stereo-
types applies with equal force to gender stereotypes).
261. For a further discussion on the anomalous result of making it easier to enact
affirmative action for women than racial minorities, see infra section III.B.
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plan enacted by the San Francisco Fire Department.262  Likewise, the
Sixth Circuit, relying on Wygant263 and Croson,264 used strict scru-
tiny in Conlin v. Blanchard265 in assessing the constitutionality of
Michigan’s gender-based affirmative action plan.  The court stated
that in order for a race- or sex-based remedial measure to withstand
scrutiny, “the remedy adopted by the state must be tailored narrowly
to achieve the goal of righting the prior discrimination.”266  Strict
scrutiny’s usage was upheld in Brunet v. Columbus,267 in which male
fire department applicants brought an action challenging an affirma-
tive action plan for hiring female applicants.  Despite acknowledging
that the Supreme Court applied an intermediate standard of review in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, the circuit court, bound by
Blanchard, invalidated the affirmative action plan under the strict
scrutiny standard.268
The majority of circuit courts have adhered to a consistent applica-
tion of intermediate scrutiny in assessing gender-based classifications
regardless of invidious or remedial purpose.  On January 4, 1974, the
eponymous Ensley Branch of the National Association for the Ad-
vancement of Colored People filed a complaint against the City of Bir-
mingham challenging its fire department’s hiring practices.269  After
Birmingham adopted consent decrees, through which Birmingham
was to initiate both race- and gender-based affirmative action policies,
a class of male non-black employees intervened.270  The Court directly
recognized the theory that “Croson changed the rule established by
Craig, Califano, and Hogan, so that gender-based affirmative action is
now subject to strict scrutiny just like race-based affirmative ac-
tion.”271  The court found the argument readily unpersuasive despite
the “odd[ity] that it is now easier to uphold affirmative action pro-
grams for women than for racial minorities.”272  Nevertheless, under
the eased burden the court was able to uphold the plan as a “suffi-
ciently important government interest,” noting that “[o]ne of the dis-
tinguishing features of intermediate scrutiny is that, unlike strict
scrutiny, the government interest prong of the inquiry can be satisfied
262. United States v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 696 F. Supp. 1287, 1293 (N.D. Cal. 1988),
aff’d as modified sub nom. Davis v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 890 F.2d 1438 (9th Cir.
1989).
263. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
264. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
265. 890 F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1989).
266. Id. at 816.
267. 1 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 1993).
268. Id. at 403–04.
269. Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994).
270. See id.
271. Id. at 1579.
272. Id. at 1579–80 (emphasis added).  For a discussion of the oddity, see infra section
III.B.
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by a showing of societal discrimination in the relevant economic
sector.”273
Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. City and
County of San Francisco274 surrounded an ordinance giving minority-
owned, women-owned, and locally owned business enterprises five
percent bidding preference for contracts over $50,000.  In using inter-
mediate scrutiny, the court adopted a lengthy and searching inquiry
into the constitutionality of the program.275  The court unearthed and
examined the measures and justifications for the affirmative action,
weighing carefully its advantages and disadvantages.276  In conceding
that laws which “afford special privileges to women raise some of the
most difficult and sensitive questions about the permissible bounds of
governmental action within the confines of the Equal Protection
Clause,” the court nevertheless upheld the provisions, specifically ena-
bled by the comparatively lax standard of review.277
In Coral Construction Co. v. King County,278 the Ninth Circuit
likewise upheld the usage of intermediate scrutiny for gender-based
affirmative action in validating part of the King County, Washington
program that established a preference for the use of minority- and wo-
men-owned businesses.279  The court was predictably urged to adopt
strict scrutiny, using Croson (by proxy of Blanchard).280  However, de-
spite the court’s “cognizance” of the “litany of problems courts found
with intermediate scrutiny,” the court found that the gender-based af-
firmative action program survived a facial challenge.281  What was
most telling about the case, however, was that the court invalidated
the nearly identical program for minority-owned businesses, under
strict scrutiny, despite having just upheld a similar gender-based pro-
gram under intermediate scrutiny.282
3. Sexual Orientation
The Supreme Court has not addressed a sexual-orientation affirm-
ative action case, though it is certainly plausible that, under Grut-
273. Id. at 1580 (citation omitted).
274. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
275. See id. at 939–41.
276. See id.
277. Id. at 939–42 (noting that “[u]nlike racial classifications which must be ‘narrowly’
tailored to the government’s objective . . . there is no requirement that gender-
based statutes be ‘drawn as precisely as [they] might have been,’” and emphasiz-
ing that the program was “substantially related to the city to the city’s important
goal of compensating women for the disparate treatment they have suffered in
the marketplace.”).
278. 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991).
279. See id. at 931.
280. Id. at 915–16.
281. Id. at 931.
282. See id. at 932.
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ter283 or Bakke,284 a school could consider sexual orientation as a
“diversity boost.”  Importantly, although no cases addressed here
make the distinction between remedial and invidious legislation,
there is nothing to suggest, even in dicta, that should courts make
such a distinction that a different level of scrutiny should apply.  The
consistency advocated by a majority of the Supreme Court appears to
have been adopted sub silentio by the respective state supreme courts
dealing with same-sex marriage.
We begin with the assumption that someone, in engineering the
“civil union,” thought that they were granting rights previously not
had to same-sex couples.  Debatably, this may be understood as reme-
dial legislation.  In the In re Marriage Cases, California’s prohibition
on same-sex marriage (a scheme, as defined by the court) included a
companion domestic partnership legislation which “afford[ed] same-
sex couples the opportunity, by entering into a domestic partnership,
to obtain virtually all of the legal benefits, privileges, responsibilities,
and duties that California law affords to and imposes upon married
couples.”285  Likewise, in Kerrigan, Connecticut had provided same-
sex couples with a “civil union law [that] was designed to benefit [the]
couples by providing them with legal rights that they previously did
not have.”286
Perry v. Brown is instructive.287  There, the court weighed the dif-
ferences, both ontological and semantic, between the “domestic part-
nership” designation and marriage.288  In finding a “meaningful”
difference between the terms, the court refused to discount the stigma
attached to a lesser-grade classification.289  Conjuring memories of
“separate but equal” and its spurious and objectionable justification,
the court incised right through the ostensibly “equal” statuses.
Powerfully, the court held:
The current statutes—by drawing a distinction between the name assigned to
the family relationship available to opposite-sex couples and the name as-
signed to the family relationship available to same-sex couples, and by reserv-
ing the historic and highly respected designation of “marriage” exclusively to
opposite-sex couples while offering same-sex couples only the new and unfa-
miliar designation of domestic partnership—pose a serious risk of denying the
official family relationship of same-sex couples the equal dignity and respect
that is a core element of the constitutional right to marry.290
283. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
284. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368 (1978).
285. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 413 (Cal. 2008).
286. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 418 (Conn. 2008).
287. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollings-
worth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
288. Id.
289. Id. at 1075.
290. Id. at 1066 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 434–35).
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Facially, the statutes appear to affirmatively grant rights upon
same-sex couples, despite their inexorable modality as a subordinat-
ing mandate.  That the current statutory scheme assigned “different
names for the official family relationships of opposite-sex couples on
the one hand, and of same-sex couples on the other,” was enough of a
red flag to raise constitutional suspicion with the California Supreme
Court.291  The sexual orientation-based classification, despite its
facially right-granting nature, was read through as “a constitutionally
suspect basis upon which to impose differential treatment” and gener-
ated the formidable strict scrutiny standard.292  The court held that
the state’s interest in retaining a picturesque idea of marriage was not
a compelling interest and excluding same-sex couples from the por-
trait was not necessary to serve such an interest.293
The court approached the scheme as transparent and pre-tex-
tual.294  In invalidating the scheme, the court found that “the mar-
riage statutes, realistically viewed, operate clearly and directly to
impose different treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual
orientation.”295  The court reasoned that by placing marriage specifi-
cally outside the reach of same-sex couples, the scheme “unquestiona-
bly” imposed differential treatment on the basis of sexual
orientation.296  Thus, despite the ostensibly endowing power of the
statute, which conferred rights on same-sex couples that they did not
previously have, the court was unable to view its beneficial aspects as
sufficient to withstand strict scrutiny.297
B. Anomalies
A startling anomaly was addressed by the Eleventh Circuit, where
the court acknowledged that “[w]hile it may seem odd that it is now
easier to uphold affirmative action programs for women than for racial
minorities, Supreme Court precedent compels that result.”298  The
Equal Protection Clause, obviously, demands that all citizens be
291. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 435.
292. Id. at 401.
293. Id. at 401–02.
294. Id. at 440–41.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 441.
297. See id. at 451.
298. Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548, 1579 (11th Cir. 1994); accord
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995) (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the framework “will produce the anomalous result that the
Government can more easily enact affirmative-action programs to remedy dis-
crimination against women than it can enact affirmative-action programs to rem-
edy discrimination against African-Americans—even though the primary
purpose of the Equal Protection Clause was to end discrimination against the
former slaves”).
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treated equally.299  As a matter of constitutional jurisprudence, it is
apparent the Court believes the level of scrutiny should comport with
the level of protection that the class deserves.300  Thus, theoretically,
the Court should be more willing to grant Congress leeway in rectify-
ing the past harms done those enslaved, beaten, subjugated, and in-
delibly stamped as inferior.301  The current framework thus leaves
Congress significantly more latitude and a higher presumption of va-
lidity to rectify harms for those who have historically suffered less.
Simply put, it is easier to enact affirmative action programs based
on gender or sexual orientation than for race.  If the Equal Protection
Clause is meant to ensure that all citizens are placed on equal footing,
the Court’s current framework impedes that goal.  As one scholar con-
cluded, “[i]nstead of serving primarily to ensure freedom from race-
based discrimination, the Court’s categorical use of rigorous review for
all suspect classifications regardless of context, functions today as a
barrier to programs designed to redress race discrimination,” leaving
minorities without equal protection of laws.302
The judicial formalism at issue does not work.  As Justice Stevens
noted, “When a court becomes preoccupied with abstract standards, it
risks sacrificing common sense at the altar of formal consistency.”303
As it stands, the Court’s adherence to consistency would mandate an
even more anomalous result in remedial sexual orientation cases.
Currently, with the exception of Windsor,304 sexual orientation has
not been granted suspect classification under federal law and has been
examined under rational basis review.  Under this standard, if a law
neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, a
court will uphold a sexual orientation classification so long as it bears
299. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
300. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 575 (1996) (citation omitted) (applying
intermediate scrutiny based on gender: “It is hard to consider women a ‘discrete
and insular minorit[y]’ unable to employ the ‘political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon,’ when they constitute a majority of the electorate.”); City of Rich-
mond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493–94 (1989) (applying strict scrutiny to
classifications discriminating against discrete and insular minorities: “Classifica-
tions based on race carry a danger of stigmatic harm.”); Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d
1052, 1100 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.
Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (“I also do not address intermedi-
ate scrutiny because Supreme Court precedent thus far has never held that sex-
ual orientation is a ‘quasi-suspect classification.’”).
301. The history of discrimination against women in our country has been systemic,
unfortunate, and lasting.  The discrimination has manifested itself in several
walks of life and persists today.  However, given the stated history of the Equal
Protection Clause, this Article takes the position that racial minorities as a class,
particularly blacks, are at least as deserving of leeway in affirmative action
legislation.
302. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 487–88.
303. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 247 (1995).
304. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012).
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a rational relation to some legitimate end.305  The burden of persua-
sion is on the challenger, who must disprove “every conceivable basis
which might support it.”306  The classification will be upheld even if
the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular
group.307
Thus, if Congress wanted to pass remedial legislation for gays and
lesbians under Romer, Perry, or U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services, it would have a much easier time passing such a bill
than one which sought to help women or minorities under the current
framework.  While women and gays and lesbians have had a torrid
history of discrimination,308 this result runs counter to the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment.  While this author still advocates that
women and gays and lesbians be the recipients of remedial legislation,
it does not make any sense to make it more difficult to enact remedial
legislation for ethnic minorities.
Even more curious is the split regarding which scrutiny level ap-
plies in orientation-based cases.  Particularly fascinating is the import
of California’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to sexual orientation-
based classifications.  California made the decision to apply the level
of scrutiny that has been described as “fatal,”309 “independently detri-
mental,”310 and a “chief instrument” to invalidate, rather than choos-
ing to apply the intermediate scrutiny standard favored by the
Connecticut Supreme Court.311  Were California to apply the Su-
preme Court’s “consistency” doctrine to sexual orientation-based re-
medial legislation cases, the legislation would face a serious uphill
battle.  For instance, suppose California, noting the extensive history
of discrimination against gays and lesbians in all walks of life,312
chose to implement a limited affirmative action policy that gave cer-
tain preferences to business enterprises owned by racial minorities,
women, and homosexuals.313  Under this hypothetical, assuming Cali-
fornia adhered to a three-tiered scrutiny framework, it would be sig-
nificantly more difficult for this legislation to withstand an equal
protection challenge under the near-fatal strict scrutiny standard.
However, had California maintained that the classification did not
merit anything but rational basis review (as numerous states and the
305. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
306. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (citation omitted).
307. Romer, 517 U.S. at 632.
308. See supra subsections II.A.2–3.
309. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 275 (1995) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
310. Goldberg, supra note 11, at 509.
311. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008).
312. See supra section II.A.3.
313. These are loosely the facts of Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910
(9th Cir. 1991).
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Supreme Court have), the legislation would pass quite easily.314
Thus, while perhaps it is not accurate to say gays and lesbians are
worse off because of the standard, they would be better off with a dif-
ferent standard—a standard that weighs the implied benefits of reme-
dial legislation with the palpable dangers of prejudice.
C. Strict Scrutiny Cannot Work for Race-Based Remedial
Legislation
Anomalies aside, strict scrutiny’s application in race-based cases
does not make much sense.  While admittedly, the consistency ap-
proach adhered to by a majority of the Supreme Court has a certain
appeal in its simplicity, the approach is replete with resultant anoma-
lies.  The Court begins by presuming that all race-based classifications
are invalid, biased, and undesirable because they stamp a race as in-
ferior.  This approach runs directly counter to most affirmative action
plans, whose stated purposes seek to remedy long-standing policies of
discrimination and exclusion.
The application of strict scrutiny to Equal Protection Clause chal-
lenges, by impeding programs that seek to rectify and ameliorate the
damage done to racial minorities, is actually preventing the Equal
Protection Clause from achieving its primary purpose.315  Again, this
result is compelled by the canon of construction requiring that
“[c]ourts should not read into a remedial statute an exception that
would impose obstacles to the achievement of its purpose.”316
Applying the same level of scrutiny for classifications that segre-
gate, subjugate, or burden racial minorities to classifications that seek
to remedy their long-standing battle against institutional racism is
classically inapposite.  Aside from the logical inconsistencies, the
framework essentially results in Congressional emasculation,317
stripping its ability to effect the purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to “ameliorat[e] the condition of the freedmen.”318 Strict scru-
tiny, as it is applied to remedial race-based classifications, ignores
several key arguments that, as a matter of jurisprudence, support
Congress’s power to remedy the harm suffered by racial minorities
under the Equal Protection Clause.
314. Cf. Contractors Ass’n of E. Pa., Inc. v. City of Phila., 6 F.3d 990 (3d Cir. 1993)
(upholding a similar business statute for the disabled under rational basis
review).
315. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976) (“[T]he 39th
Congress [that enacted the Fourteenth Amendment] was intent upon establish-
ing in the federal law a broader principle than would have been necessary simply
to meet the particular and immediate plight of the newly freed Negro slaves.”).
316. 3 SINGER & SINGER, supra note 63, § 60:1 (emphasis added).
317. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
318. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (statement of Rep. Stevens).
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The Court’s adherence to constitutional color blindness, in the face
of the extensive history behind the Fourteenth Amendment, violates
many of the statutory construction principles articulated in section
II.B.  In fact, in Bakke, Justice Brennan himself noted that “[n]othing
whatever in the legislative history of either the Fourteenth Amend-
ment or the Civil Rights Acts even remotely suggests that the States
are foreclosed from furthering the fundamental purpose of equal op-
portunity to which the Amendment and those Acts are addressed.”319
Rather, as one court put it, “[T]he amendment sought to ensure that
the law would no longer turn a blind eye to the indignities that Black
Americans were forced to endure as a result of their race.”320  It is
implausible, if not absurd, to suggest that the Thirty-Ninth Congress
intended the Amendment to be used to prevent racial minorities from
obtaining ameliorative support.
Strict scrutiny’s impact as the affirmative action death knell does a
disservice to its stated purpose—to “smoke out illegitimate uses of
race.”321  Strict scrutiny, masquerading as “searching judicial in-
quiry,” attempts to ensure that the legislative body is pursuing a goal
important enough to warrant the use of the racial classification.322
The Court’s hesitance to uphold any racial classification is grounded
in concerns that the legislation has some hidden purpose to perpetu-
ate racial inferiority or effect illegitimate racial prejudice.323
However, the stark reality is that the Court’s decision to use strict
scrutiny effectively forecloses any meaningful examination. The un-
yielding standard begins with such a presumption of bias and illegiti-
macy that the Court is unable to make a truly neutral and searching
analysis.  It specifically bemused Justice Marshall, who thought it
“made no sense for the Court to reject, a priori, any serious effort to
smoke out invidious motive in the non-paradigm cases.”324  The
Court’s conclusion that “racial characteristics so seldom provide a rel-
evant basis for disparate treatment” necessarily compels the point.325
319. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 368 (1978) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).  Even the majority con-
cluded that “[n]one of these sources lends support to the proposition that
Congress intended to bar all race-conscious efforts to extend the benefits of feder-
ally financed programs to minorities who have been historically excluded from
the full benefits of American life.” Id. at 336.
320. Aiken v. City of Memphis, 37 F.3d 1155, 1172 (6th Cir. 1994) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
321. Jed Rubenfeld, Affirmative Action, 107 YALE L.J. 427, 436 (1997).
322. Id. at 438–40.
323. Id. at 445–48.
324. Brown, supra note 202, at 646–47 (2009).
325. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (citation omitted);
see also Goldberg, supra note 11, at 575–76 (noting the language used to strike
down race-based classifications often more closely reflects rational basis review
than strict scrutiny).
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The Court’s insistence on beginning the inquiry with such a skewed
predisposition eliminates the ability to really determine whether or
not the classification truly perpetuates prejudice.  A lesser, more com-
pliant standard of review would allow the Court to consider the illogi-
cal results of its consistent framework, as well as the stated remedial
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.
D. Justice Marshall’s Flexible and Searching Sliding-Scale
Standard Should Replace the Traditional Three-
Tiered Review
This argument’s vitality and success depend on an important pred-
icate assumption: the reader recognizes that affirmative action and
similar remedial legislative programs are not invidious.  To some, dis-
tinguishing between remedial and invidious racial classifications does
not require a rigorous review or an abstract calculus.326  Affirmative
action programs are labeled as such and seek to rectify past harms or
generate a more inclusive work or educational environment.  This was
the Freedman Bureau’s objective327 and is the objective of the Equal
Protection Clause as it has been interpreted by several justices.328
The test balances the importance of the interest against the invidi-
ousness of the legislation.329  Here, race, gender, and sexual orienta-
tion all merit significantly close scrutiny because of the interests
affected and the history of discrimination,330 but that would be
counteracted or mediated by the stated remedial purpose of the
legislation.
The Court would have an uphill battle explaining the invidious-
ness of an explicitly remedial statute but could make strong argu-
ments regarding the “societal importance of the interest adversely
affected,”331 specifically in reverse affirmative action cases, whereby
people from social classes who have traditionally evaded discrimina-
tion seek to invalidate affirmative action mandates.332  Justice Scalia
has repeatedly cited the unfavorable effects on those outside the scope
326. See, e.g., Adarand, 515 U.S. at 244–46 (Stevens, J., dissenting); City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 530 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Contra
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring).
327. Schnapper, supra note 45, at 785 (citation omitted). R
328. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
329. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
330. See supra section II.A.
331. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
332. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert.
granted, 132 S. Ct. 1536 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Brunet v. City of
Columbus, 1 F.3d 390, 404 (6th Cir. 1993).
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of affirmative action statutes.333  Thus, for example, legislators would
have to tailor the statute in the following ways:
The terms of the decree cannot require the discharge of non-minority workers
and their replacement with minorities.  The decree’s provisions cannot bar ab-
solutely the advancement of opportunities of non-minorities . . . . [T]he decree
must be a temporary remedy designed to terminate when it has eliminated
the racial imbalance.  The decree cannot mandate the hiring or promotion of
unqualified individuals.334
Naturally, the sliding-scale standard would work extremely well
for gender-based remedial legislation cases and would settle the afore-
mentioned circuit split between intermediate scrutiny and strict scru-
tiny.335  The balancing test inherent in the standard would work well
to “smoke out” illegitimate classifications based on stereotypes, specif-
ically those which “exclude qualified individuals based on fixed no-
tions concerning the roles and abilities of males and females.”336  As
mentioned previously, laws which discriminate on the basis of gender
“raise some of the most difficult and sensitive questions about the per-
missible bounds of governmental action within the confines of the
[E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause.”337  The Court could weigh the remedial
interests being served against the possibility that legislation would
actually reinforce gender stereotypes.  Further, the framework would
not produce the anomalous result in which it is easier to enact affirma-
tive action policies for women rather than blacks.  Courts could no
longer hide behind pre-textual conclusions and could no longer “avoid
the telling task of searching for a substantial state interest.”338
Lastly, a balancing, sliding-scale approach would give LGBT per-
sons protection under the Fourteenth Amendment without jeopardiz-
ing the Legislature’s ability to enact statutes that serve to rectify past
harm.  The approach would recognize the serious and unfortunate his-
tory and persecution gays and lesbians have faced in this country339
and could accordingly offer protection commensurate to suspect or
quasi-suspect status.  Further, it would eliminate the need to discern
333. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pen˜a, 515 U.S. 200, 239 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
334. Stotts v. Memphis Fire Dept., 679 F.2d 541, 553 (6th Cir. 1982) (citations omit-
ted), rev’d sub nom. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561
(1984).
335. Compare Coral Const. Co. v. King Cnty., 941 F.2d 910, 931 (9th Cir. 1991) (apply-
ing intermediate scrutiny), with Brunet, 1 F.3d at 404 (applying strict scrutiny).
336. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 517 (1996) (citation omitted). Contra
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (recognizing that real biological differences
between the sexes sometimes can justify differential treatment without running
afoul of the Equal Protection Clause).
337. Ensley Branch, NAACP v. Seibels, 31 F.3d 1548 (11th Cir. 1994).
338. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
339. See supra subsection II.A.3.
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between regular rational basis review, rational basis with bite, and
rational basis plus.  Justice Marshall expressed particular distaste
with the different forms of rational basis, articulating in Cleburne:
[B]y failing to articulate the factors that justify today’s “second order” ra-
tional-basis review, the Court provides no principled foundation for determin-
ing when more searching inquiry is to be invoked.  Lower courts are thus left
in the dark on this important question, and this Court remains unaccountable
for its decisions employing, or refusing to employ, particularly searching
scrutiny.340
Under the sliding-scale framework the LGBT community would re-
ceive suspect or quasi-suspect class status in light of its relative politi-
cal powerlessness and unfortunate history of discrimination and could
benefit from legislation or policies aimed at recompensing those
aggrieved.
The classification would raise red flags (akin to gender classifica-
tions) and would allow the Court to “smoke out” illegitimate schemes
based on sexual orientation-based discrimination.  The Court would be
free to recognize that schemes like civil union statutes that appear
remedial on their face “operate clearly and directly to impose different
treatment on gay individuals because of their sexual orientation.”341
Plaintiffs would no longer have to bear the onus of having to disprove
“every conceivable basis which might support it” as required under
traditional rational basis review.342
The difficulty with the three-tiered system is most evident at the
poles.  While it would be possible for an LGBT plaintiff to withstand
strict scrutiny in a case concerning remedial legislation, the Supreme
Court’s consistency framework would mandate rational basis review,
which has traditionally led to government-favored results.343  Con-
versely, if California followed the Supreme Court’s “consistency” ap-
proach—as most courts have—and applied strict scrutiny to truly
remedial and beneficial statutes based on sexual orientation, the stat-
utes would likely be invalidated given the strict bias presumption at-
tached to strict scrutiny.  Herein lies another anomaly: under the
consistency approach, it seems almost impossible to have a framework
that would protect the LGBT community from invidious legislation
but at the same time support legislation that would remedy the iniqui-
tous effects past legislation has caused.
Under the sliding-scale framework, California would be free to en-
act truly remedial legislation.  By not sounding strict scrutiny’s “death
knell,” states would be free to enact the sorts of remedial legislation
340. City of Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 460 (1985) (Mar-
shall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
341. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 440–41 (Cal. 2008).
342. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320–21 (1993) (citation omitted).
343. Recall “[t]he extremes to which the Court has gone in dreaming up rational bases
for state regulation.”  Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520 (1970).
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that some believe desirable.  This is consistent with Perry’s statement
that “states should be free ‘to experiment’ with social policy, without
fear of being locked in to ‘legislation that has proved unworkable or
harmful when the State was under no obligation to adopt the legisla-
tion in the first place.’”344  Thus, should state universities wish to in-
clude gays and lesbians in their “critical mass,” they would be free to
do so.345
Likewise, Justice Marshall’s framework would resolve the current
split between federal appellate review346 applying rational basis re-
view, and state appellate review347 applying heightened scrutiny.  Re-
gardless, it will be incumbent upon the court to determine whether an
invidious motive exists, and if so, it would not matter whether the ag-
grieved were part of a “suspect class”—they would receive their com-
mensurate equal protection under law.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this case, judicial formalism has reached its limits.  The Court’s
current approach to remedial legislation that makes race, gender, or
sexual orientation-based classifications is unsustainable.  The Court
has made it virtually impossible for Congress or states to effect the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and is doing so in the face of
strong canonical mandates to the contrary.  The framework has re-
sulted in absurdities and ignores the tenet that the level of scrutiny is
designed to comport with the level of protection the class deserves.
The Court should abandon its current framework and instead weigh
the level of protection the class deserves and the potential good the
legislation can serve against any veiled motives or inimical intent.
344. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1085 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom. Hol-
lingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013) (cita-
tion omitted).
345. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
346. Compare Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012), and Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted sub nom.
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012), vacated, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013),
with Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S.
Ct. 786 (2012), aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
347. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399–401 (Cal. 2008); Kerrigan v. Comm’r
of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 423 (Conn. 2008).
